Live TLS-IM

ETHERTRUST · INTERNET OF SECURE ELEMENTS

Recursive TLS-IM Live Demo

Explore TLS 1.3 PSK authentication delegated to a remote TLS Identity Module. A TLS-IM computes the Binder and Handshake Secret while the TLS-SE provides a hardware-backed cryptographic service.

UNDERSTANDING THE TECHNOLOGY

What is TLS-IM?

TLS-IM (TLS Identity Module) is a hardware-backed identity service that protects the cryptographic secret used by a TLS 1.3 PSK client. Instead of storing the target server’s pre-shared key in WordPress or handing it to the TLS client, an independent Secure Element performs the required Binder and Derive computations.

For this demo, the remote TLS-IM is itself accessed through a separate TLS 1.3 PSK session, using a software PSK dedicated to access. The target TLS-SE authentication secret (PSK3) stays in the TLS-IM Secure Element. WordPress receives the calculated Binder and handshake secret, not PSK3.

How recursive TLS authentication works

It is called recursive because the TLS client establishes a first protected TLS session to the TLS-IM in order to authenticate a second protected TLS session to the target TLS-SE.

CLIENT · WORDPRESS / PHP

Builds the TLS 1.3 ClientHello, creates an ephemeral P-256 key pair and manages the encrypted KMS connection.

Controls both TLS sessions

SESSION A · TLS-IM

TLS 1.3 PSK with a separate software access PSK. Remote commands ?D0 and ?D1 operate on protected PSK3.

PSK3 remains in hardware

SESSION B · TARGET TLS-SE

TLS 1.3 PSK-DHE using the external Binder and Derive result. Once the Finished messages are verified, KMS commands use encrypted application records.

One session for all scenario commands

  1. Connect to TLS-IM: WordPress establishes session A with the software access PSK.
  2. Binder — ?D0: TLS-IM computes the ClientHello authentication value using PSK3.
  3. Key exchange: TLS-SE answers the ClientHello; WordPress calculates the ephemeral ECDHE P-256 shared secret.
  4. Derive — ?D1: TLS-IM derives the handshake secret. ?D2 is an optional hardware-acknowledged variant reserved for administrator tests.
  5. Authenticate and run: WordPress verifies the TLS-SE Server Finished, sends Client Finished and exchanges all selected KMS commands over session B.

What this demonstration proves

The target TLS-SE PSK3 is not provisioned to the WordPress application. Binder and Derive are delegated to a remote Secure Element. WordPress does temporarily handle the resulting handshake and traffic secrets to establish the second TLS session. The TLS-SE session closes when the chosen test scenario finishes; this is an experimental demonstration, not a production TLS client.

ETHERTRUST · TLS-IM RECURSIVE AUTHENTICATION

Live Cryptographic Test

Select one TLS-IM SNI and one pNHSM SNI, or allocate available endpoints automatically. All KMS commands run in one target TLS 1.3 session, using the selected remote TLS-IM for Binder and Derive.

pnhsm · 8 TLS-IM SNI / pnhsm · 8 pNHSM SNI · Each test reserves both endpoints until the scenario finishes.


      
Ready

Experimental demo on dedicated test hardware. Commands are validated server-side. TLS-IM PSK3 remains inside the Secure Element. Sessions close after each scenario.

Test Scenario Library

Scenarios and comments are stored directly in this WordPress page. To add a test, duplicate an <article class="etrl-scenario"> block and give it a unique data-id. Each non-comment line is a KMS command. Lines beginning with # are ignored by the device.

01 · Identify the TLS-SE

Read the TLS-SE 3.05 identification string and perform an ASCII echo.

# TLS-SE version
?00
# Verify the ASCII shell
?01Hello TLS-SE

02 · ECC secp256k1

Read a pre-existing secp256k1 public key and request an ECDSA signature with slot 1.

# Public key in ECC slot 1
p01
# Sign a fixed 32-byte demonstration value
s0100112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF

03 · ECC secp256r1

Read a pre-existing secp256r1 public key and request an ECDSA signature with slot 1.

# Public key in ECC slot 1
p11
# ECDSA signature with prime256v1
s1100112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF

04 · RSA-2048

Read the public RSA modulus and exponent from slot 1, then compute an RSA signature.

# RSA-2048 public modulus
p2100
# RSA public exponent
p2101
# Sign a fixed hexadecimal test value
s2100112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF

05 · AES-128 encryption

Encrypt one 16-byte block using an existing test secret in slot 0.

# Encrypt a single 16-byte block (secret slot 0)
A0000112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF

06 · AES-128 decryption

Decrypt a standard AES-128 test vector. Requires the test key 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F to be pre-provisioned in slot 0.

# AES-128 test-vector ciphertext, slot-0 key required
a0069C4E0D86A7B0430D8CDB78070B4C55A

07 · HMAC-SHA-256

Compute HMAC-SHA-256 using a pre-provisioned secret in slot 0.

# ASCII "Hello" encoded as hex
h0048656C6C6F
# HMAC with an ASCII text message
m00Hello

08 · Prepare ECC secp256k1 (demo only)

Clear and regenerate the test-only secp256k1 slot 1 before signing. Requires key changes enabled.

# DEMO-ONLY: overwrite test slot 1
c01
g01
p01
s0100112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF

09 · Prepare ECC secp256r1 (demo only)

Clear and regenerate the test-only prime256v1 slot 1. Requires key changes enabled.

# DEMO-ONLY: overwrite test slot 1
c11
g11
p11
s1100112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF

10 · Prepare RSA-2048 (demo only)

Clear and regenerate RSA slot 1. Requires key changes enabled.

# DEMO-ONLY: overwrite RSA slot 1
c21
g21
# RSA modulus
p2100
# RSA exponent
p2101
s2100112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF

11 · Provision test AES key (demo only)

Write a disposable 128-bit test key and encrypt one block. Requires key changes enabled.

# DEMO-ONLY: replace slot-0 secret
t30000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
# AES encryption with that secret
A0000112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF

Scenarios 08–11 modify demo keys and require an explicit administrator setting. The other cryptographic scenarios require previously provisioned test keys or secrets. The administrator controls which operations are executable, regardless of the HTML content.