ETHERTRUST · INTERNET OF SECURE ELEMENTS
Recursive TLS-IM Live Demo
Explore TLS 1.3 PSK authentication delegated to a remote TLS Identity Module. A TLS-IM computes the Binder and Handshake Secret while the TLS-SE provides a hardware-backed cryptographic service.
UNDERSTANDING THE TECHNOLOGY
What is TLS-IM?
TLS-IM (TLS Identity Module) is a hardware-backed identity service that protects the cryptographic secret used by a TLS 1.3 PSK client. Instead of storing the target server’s pre-shared key in WordPress or handing it to the TLS client, an independent Secure Element performs the required Binder and Derive computations.
For this demo, the remote TLS-IM is itself accessed through a separate TLS 1.3 PSK session, using a software PSK dedicated to access. The target TLS-SE authentication secret (PSK3) stays in the TLS-IM Secure Element. WordPress receives the calculated Binder and handshake secret, not PSK3.
How recursive TLS authentication works
It is called recursive because the TLS client establishes a first protected TLS session to the TLS-IM in order to authenticate a second protected TLS session to the target TLS-SE.
CLIENT · WORDPRESS / PHP
Builds the TLS 1.3 ClientHello, creates an ephemeral P-256 key pair and manages the encrypted KMS connection.
Controls both TLS sessions
SESSION A · TLS-IM
TLS 1.3 PSK with a separate software access PSK. Remote commands ?D0 and ?D1 operate on protected PSK3.
PSK3 remains in hardware
SESSION B · TARGET TLS-SE
TLS 1.3 PSK-DHE using the external Binder and Derive result. Once the Finished messages are verified, KMS commands use encrypted application records.
One session for all scenario commands
- Connect to TLS-IM: WordPress establishes session A with the software access PSK.
- Binder —
?D0: TLS-IM computes the ClientHello authentication value using PSK3. - Key exchange: TLS-SE answers the ClientHello; WordPress calculates the ephemeral ECDHE P-256 shared secret.
- Derive —
?D1: TLS-IM derives the handshake secret.?D2is an optional hardware-acknowledged variant reserved for administrator tests. - Authenticate and run: WordPress verifies the TLS-SE Server Finished, sends Client Finished and exchanges all selected KMS commands over session B.
What this demonstration proves
The target TLS-SE PSK3 is not provisioned to the WordPress application. Binder and Derive are delegated to a remote Secure Element. WordPress does temporarily handle the resulting handshake and traffic secrets to establish the second TLS session. The TLS-SE session closes when the chosen test scenario finishes; this is an experimental demonstration, not a production TLS client.
Live Cryptographic Test
Select one TLS-IM SNI and one pNHSM SNI, or allocate available endpoints automatically. All KMS commands run in one target TLS 1.3 session, using the selected remote TLS-IM for Binder and Derive.
pnhsm · 8 TLS-IM SNI / pnhsm · 8 pNHSM SNI · Each test reserves both endpoints until the scenario finishes.
Experimental demo on dedicated test hardware. Commands are validated server-side. TLS-IM PSK3 remains inside the Secure Element. Sessions close after each scenario.
Test Scenario Library
Scenarios and comments are stored directly in this WordPress page. To add a test, duplicate an <article class="etrl-scenario"> block and give it a unique data-id. Each non-comment line is a KMS command. Lines beginning with # are ignored by the device.
01 · Identify the TLS-SE
Read the TLS-SE 3.05 identification string and perform an ASCII echo.
# TLS-SE version ?00 # Verify the ASCII shell ?01Hello TLS-SE
02 · ECC secp256k1
Read a pre-existing secp256k1 public key and request an ECDSA signature with slot 1.
# Public key in ECC slot 1 p01 # Sign a fixed 32-byte demonstration value s0100112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF
03 · ECC secp256r1
Read a pre-existing secp256r1 public key and request an ECDSA signature with slot 1.
# Public key in ECC slot 1 p11 # ECDSA signature with prime256v1 s1100112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF
04 · RSA-2048
Read the public RSA modulus and exponent from slot 1, then compute an RSA signature.
# RSA-2048 public modulus p2100 # RSA public exponent p2101 # Sign a fixed hexadecimal test value s2100112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF
05 · AES-128 encryption
Encrypt one 16-byte block using an existing test secret in slot 0.
# Encrypt a single 16-byte block (secret slot 0) A0000112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF
06 · AES-128 decryption
Decrypt a standard AES-128 test vector. Requires the test key 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F to be pre-provisioned in slot 0.
# AES-128 test-vector ciphertext, slot-0 key required a0069C4E0D86A7B0430D8CDB78070B4C55A
07 · HMAC-SHA-256
Compute HMAC-SHA-256 using a pre-provisioned secret in slot 0.
# ASCII "Hello" encoded as hex h0048656C6C6F # HMAC with an ASCII text message m00Hello
08 · Prepare ECC secp256k1 (demo only)
Clear and regenerate the test-only secp256k1 slot 1 before signing. Requires key changes enabled.
# DEMO-ONLY: overwrite test slot 1 c01 g01 p01 s0100112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF
09 · Prepare ECC secp256r1 (demo only)
Clear and regenerate the test-only prime256v1 slot 1. Requires key changes enabled.
# DEMO-ONLY: overwrite test slot 1 c11 g11 p11 s1100112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF
10 · Prepare RSA-2048 (demo only)
Clear and regenerate RSA slot 1. Requires key changes enabled.
# DEMO-ONLY: overwrite RSA slot 1 c21 g21 # RSA modulus p2100 # RSA exponent p2101 s2100112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF
11 · Provision test AES key (demo only)
Write a disposable 128-bit test key and encrypt one block. Requires key changes enabled.
# DEMO-ONLY: replace slot-0 secret t30000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F # AES encryption with that secret A0000112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF
Scenarios 08–11 modify demo keys and require an explicit administrator setting. The other cryptographic scenarios require previously provisioned test keys or secrets. The administrator controls which operations are executable, regardless of the HTML content.